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In a panel across twenty-eight countries over 10 years, we show that family firms on
average enjoy performance advantages over nonfamily firms only when labor mar-
kets are less regulated. We confirm this result in a matched firm sample using a
survey-based instrument as a family control. Furthermore, family firms exhibit lower
variation in employment levels in less-regulated labor markets, supporting the notion
that labor relations drive family firms’ performance advantages. Our results are
consistent with the notion that both family ownership and labor market reforms
provide employment protection and thus partly substitute as governance mecha-
nisms. (JEL G32)
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Introduction
Family firms are dominant in most countries around the world (La
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and many studies have shown that family firms perform differently from
nonfamily firms (Anderson and Reeb 2003; Perez-Gonzalez 2006;
Villalonga and Amit 2006; Bennedsen et al. 2007; Miller et al. 2007).
However, scholars have only recently started opening the black box of
why family firms perform differently.1 In this paper, we investigate the
performance difference between family and nonfamily firms by focusing
on families’ special contribution to their firms. We show that family firms
perform better in the absence of labor market regulation (LMR) and tie
this performance difference to how families treat their employees, that is,
to labor relations.
We focus on the role of country-level differences in LMR to explain
the performance difference between family-controlled and non-family-
controlled corporations. We posit that if family firms are better at insur-
ing labor, the relationship-specific investment or incentives to work
harder may increase, leading to outperformance by family firms. The
paper’s main hypothesis (which we elaborate on in the following section)
is that the absence of formal labor market regulation potentially induces
a relative performance advantage for family firms.
LMR is an important institutional roadblock that has been studied
extensively in the macroeconomic literature on barriers for growth. We
contribute to this literature by analyzing the firm-level effects of LMR on
performance and labor volatility and, in particular, the differential im-
pact of LMR on family-controlled and non-family-controlled corpora-
tions. We use the OECD employment protection index to measure LMR
across countries and time. The measure has a strong focus on protecting
employees from being separated from their jobs and is constructed from
submeasures of regular employment protection, temporary employment
protection, and the cost of collective dismissals. We document that sig-
nificant variation exists in the OECD employment protection measure
across countries. Importantly, this variation goes well beyond variation
in gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and other institutional con-
straints, such as investor protection and product market competition.
We assemble a data set of 6,983 firms in twenty-eight countries (based
on Lins, Volpin, and Wagner 2013). Our firms are large publicly traded
corporations, and we use a conservative 25% threshold of voting rights
via direct or indirect family shareholdings to define family firms in our
benchmark analysis. We collect firm-level data for these firms and inves-
tigate to what extent regulation of the labor market and being a family
firm interact.
The contribution of the paper can be summarized as follows. First, we
find that, in general, LMR does not strongly affect firms’ performance.
Second, we document that family-controlled corporations on average
1 See Bertrand and Schoar (2006) and Bennedsen et al. (2010) for surveys.
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have higher operating performance and return on capital employed rel-
ative to non-family-controlled corporations only in countries with less-
regulated labor markets. Third, we show that family firms have less labor
volatility only in countries with lower labor market regulation. The two
latter findings are consistent with the idea that the ability of family firms
to protect labor generates a relative performance advantage in less-
regulated countries.
Like most cross-sectional country studies, our analysis is subject to
identification challenges that make causal statements difficult. We high-
light two such challenges in the paper: First, in a cross-country setting of
large publicly traded firms, there might be significant differences in firm
characteristics between family and nonfamily firms, and across countries.
Accounting for this effect, we confirm our main results using matched
samples of family and nonfamily firms. Second, the choice of being a
family firm may be affected by the level of regulation in general. Some
firms may choose to stay with highly concentrated family ownership, and
we cannot be sure this choice is independent of regulation. This concern
is supported by the observation that the share of family firms across
countries is negatively correlated with the degree of labor market regu-
lation. To mitigate this concern, we instrument the presence of family
firms across countries using survey-based questions from the World
Value Survey about the strength of family values and trust levels across
countries. Our main finding is present in both our matched analysis and
when we instrument the ownership choice, providing some comfort re-
garding the obvious endogeneity concerns. Still, we are well aware of the
limitations of these tests, especially in a cross-country setting.
We provide further robustness tests. We document that our results are
not merely a reflection of omitting other country-level roadblocks that
may be correlated with labor market protection. Our results are robust to
controlling for shareholder protection, measured by the Anti-self-dealing
index and Antidirector index, and economic development, measured by
the logarithm of GDP per capita. Additionally, the performance differ-
ence between family and nonfamily firms is present only when condition-
ing on LMR but not when conditioning on shareholder protection or
economic development. Furthermore, the results are robust to using me-
dian regressions, winsorizing at various levels, excluding Japan, and con-
sidering return on equity as well as Tobin’s q as dependent variables.
By showing that LMR differentially affects family-controlled and non-
family-controlled corporations, we also contribute to a recent literature
that shows how institutional roadblocks are important for the relative
performance of family firms (Bennedsen and Fan 2014; Bennedsen et al.
2015). Ellul, Pagano, and Panunzi (2010) show that the strictness of in-
heritance laws affects family firms negatively. Tsoutsoura (2013) docu-
ments how the removal of inheritance taxes in Greece improved
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investment in family firms around succession, and Bennedsen and
Nielsen (2010) document how family firm control can provide value in
countries with weak investor protection. The notion that regulation
interacts with ownership and other firm level corporate governance struc-
tures is also a persistent theme in the law and finance literature (La Porta
et al. 1998; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 1999).
2. Hypotheses and Empirical Strategy
The macroeconomic literature on the relationship between growth and
regulation of labor and product markets shows that tight LMR is cor-
related with lower growth, higher unemployment and more rent seeking
from incumbent firms (see, e.g., Botero et al. 2004; Besley and Burgess
2004; Blanchard and Giavazzi 2003). Inspired by these results, our de-
parture is to ask how labor regulation and family firm ownership inter-
act. Labor contracts both provide incentives for workers to supply effort
and relation-specific investment and provide optimal risk allocation be-
tween firms and workers (Knight 1921; Bailey 1974; Azariadis 1975).
In theory, LMR comes with costs and benefits for firms. On the cost
side, high firing costs make it costly to downsize the work force and make
it difficult to adapt to fast changes in the business environment. On the
benefit side, protection of workers can increase the relation-specific in-
vestment by workers that are concerned about being held up by the
company. Thus, the actual firm level effect of the strength of LMR
will depend on how firm structures affect the tradeoff between labor
cost and workers relations specific investment.
Recent firm-level studies have found significant differences in manage-
ment practices for family-controlled firms (Bloom and Van Reenen 2007;
Bennedsen et al. 2007). Family business scholars have argued that family
firms are better at managing stakeholders and have a more loyal labor
force (see, e.g., Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson 1997; Lansberg 1983,
1988). Further, family firms have been shown to be better at insuring
labor (Sraer and Thesmar 2007; Mueller and Philippon 2011; Bach and
Serrano-Velarde 2015; Ellul, Pagano, and Schivardi 2018), which could
lead to an increase in relationship-specific investments or incentives to
work harder. In this paper, we start from (and later confirm) the above
documented notion that family firms are better at insuring workers and
paying lower wages.
We argue that labor insurance can come either through ownership—
that is a firm being family controlled—or through labor market regula-
tion that provides rules for hiring and firing workers. From this follows
the paper’s main hypothesis: the absence of labor market regulation
induces a potential performance advantage for family firms. We then
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ask in which environment family ownership creates more value, given
that implicit labor contracts and labor market regulation jointly affect
the incentives of individual workers. Family firms’ superior relationship
with their workers yields a comparative advantage in environments
where this implicit insurance is most valuable. Given that both implicit
labor contracts and labor market regulation provide insurance, we hy-
pothesize that family firms will have a comparative advantage in coun-
tries in which less labor market regulation exists.
Our empirical strategy of measuring LMR focuses on firing costs and
how easy it is to separate workers from their jobs. Strong labor market
regulation reduces the freedom of designing both explicit and implicit
labor contracts. When regulation increases the cost of separating workers
from firms, this can induce both benefits and costs on the individual firm.
The most obvious impact is that higher firing costs and less flexible use
of temporary workers make it difficult for firms to adapt to changes in
the business environment. This may increase firm-level costs or induce
firms to forgo business opportunities because hiring more labor is risky.
On the benefit side, labor protection can increase relationship-specific
investments if workers are concerned about hold-up. Hence, workers
who feel safer in their jobs may invest more in skills that are specific to
the individual firm. Another firm-level benefit of stronger regulation is
that it will serve as a barrier to entry for new firms or for foreign firms
that are considering establishing new firms or plants in a given country.
Note that if regulation is a powerful barrier to entry, incumbent firms
may, on net, benefit from regulation even if it increases labor costs and
overall reduces industry or country-level growth.
In our baseline tests we examine the relation between family owner-
ship, country-level LMR and firms’ performance using the specification
yit ¼ aþ b1Xi þ b2Yct1 þ b3Xi  Yit1 þ c0Zit1 þ Kþ eit;
where the dependent is firm i’s performance in year t, Xi is a family
ownership dummy variable (1/0), Yct1 is LMR in country c in year
t1, Zit1 are a set of firm-level control variables in year t1, and K
are year, industry, and country fixed effects.
Our empirical strategy is subject to qualifications. First, endogeneity
and more specifically potential reverse causality may affect our results.
While we attempt to establish causality through matching techniques and
instrumental variable estimates, these techniques themselves have limita-
tions, with the most important being that country-level variables to use-
fully instrument family ownership are hard to find. Second, as in virtually
all cross-country settings, data quality and lack of coverage for smaller
firms are important issues. For example, many firms lack basic wage
data, allowing us to only use subsamples. Finally, while the cross-
country setting gives us useful heterogeneity in LMR, at the same time
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it limits our ability to pin down the precise channels through which the
performance wedge between family and nonfamily firms arises. To illus-
trate, while relationship specific investments made by workers in family
firms are one of the likely channels through which profitability of family
firms is augmented relative to other firms in the absence of formal LMR,
our data set lacks proxy variables for such investments at the firm level.
3. Data and Summary Statistics
The focus of this paper is to study whether labor market regulation
affects the performance difference between family and nonfamily firms.
In this section, we provide a description of our data. We introduce the
labor market regulation measures and how these measures compare to
other country-level roadblocks, such as investor protection, product mar-
ket regulation, and welfare. We then describe the sample and control
variables.
3.1 Labor market regulation
The OECD provides a yearly measure of employment protection based
on data collected by the International Labor Organization (ILO). The
ILO uses country officials and law experts to collect detailed information
about firing procedures and notification rules, as well as valid and invalid
reasons for firing individuals or groups of workers. All information is
aggregated into an employment protection indicator, which we hence-
forth refer to as overall employment protection. Importantly, this measure
is comparable across countries.
Figure 1 summarizes how the overall employment protection measure is
constructed. The overall employment protection measure is composed of
three submeasures: (1) individual dismissal of workers with regular con-
tracts (weighted with 5/12); (2) regulation of temporary contracts
(weighted with 5/12); and (3) additional costs for collective dismissals
(weighted with 2/12). Submeasure (1), which we henceforth refer to as
regular employment protection, is the equally weighted mean of measures
for procedural inconveniences, notice and severance pay for no-fault in-
dividual dismissals, and difficulty of dismissal—all as a function of how
many years an employee has been on a regular contract. Submeasure (2),
which we henceforth refer to as temporary employment protection, is the
equally weighted mean of measures of fixed-term contract conditions and
temporary work agency employment. This measure focuses on issues
such as when and for which type of work a temporary contract can be
used, what the maximum length of a single temporary contract can be,
and how many times temporary contracts can be renewed before the
worker is required to be offered a regular contract. Submeasure (3) is
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henceforth referred to as collective dismissal protection. This measure
quantifies regulatory burdens and costs that go beyond regular employ-
ment protection in that they apply to the dismissal of large groups of
workers.
The OECD standardizes employment protection such that the measure
decreases in the strictness of regulation on a scale from 0 to 5. We subtract
this measure from 5 to obtain a measure that increases in labor market
regulation. Table 1 summarizes the labor market measures by country in
2008 (panel A) and their correlations (panel B). Countries are sorted by
overall labor market protection, starting with the least protected country. The
least protected countries are the United Kingdom, Canada, and Ireland.
The most protected countries are Turkey, Portugal, Mexico, and France.
Panel B also provides insights into the LMR submeasure. First, overall
LMR is positively correlated with two of its subcomponents (temporary
and regular LMR) but uncorrelated with collective dismissal. Second, the
three subcomponents are not strongly correlated with each other, which
is why we investigate which of them drives our result below.
3. Notice period after 9 months
4 years
20 years
4. Severance pay after 4 years
20 years









9. Maximum time for claim
10. Valid cases for use of fixed-term contracts
11. Maximum number of successive contracts
12. Maximum cumulated duration




20. Additional delays involved
21. Other special costs to employers
1. Notification procedures
2. Delay to start a notice
Procedural inconveniences 
(1/3)
Notice and severance pay for 
no-fault individual dismissals 
(1/3)
Difficulty of dismissal (1/3)
Fixed term contracts (1/2)
Temporary work agency 
employment (1/2)
14. Restrictions on number of renewals
15. Maximum cumulated duration
16. Authorisation and reporting
17. Equal treatment
19. Additional notification requirements
8. Reinstatement
Figure 1
OECD employment protection measures
This figure summarizes the compilation of the OECD employment protection measure. The overall
measure is constructed by weighting three submeasures: (1) individual dismissal of workers with regular
contracts (weighted with 5/12), (2) regulation of temporary contracts (weighted with 5/12), and (3) ad-
ditional costs for collective dismissals (weighted with 2/12). Measure (1), which is henceforth referred to
as regular employment protection, is the equally weighted mean of measures for procedural inconvenien-
ces, notice, and severance pay for no-fault individual dismissals and difficulty of dismissal. Measure (2),
which is henceforth referred to as temporary employment protection, is the equally weighted mean of
measures of fixed-term contract conditions and temporary work agency employment. Measure (3) is
henceforth referred to as collective dismissal protection.
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3.2 Other institutional roadblocks
As we aim to explore the impact of labor market roadblocks on the
performance difference between family and nonfamily firms, it is impor-
tant that our LMR measure is not highly correlated with other country-
level variables faced by firms. In the following, we focus on institutional
roadblocks (investor protection and product market regulation) and wel-
fare. First, we study the correlation between labor market regulation and
two investor protection measures. The Anti-self-dealing index measures
the strength of minority shareholder protection against self-dealing con-
ducted by controlling shareholders (Djankov et al. 2008). The Revised
antidirector index is an index that ranges from 0 to 5, depending on how
many of five different shareholder rights a country fulfills (La Porta et al.
1998; Djankov et al. 2008). Second, we focus on measures of economic
development using the log of GDP per capita fromWorld Bank and GDP
growth between 2003 and 2008. Third, we examine the relation between
LMR and measures of product market regulation provided by the
OECD, namely the OECD’s overall product market regulation measure
and its three submeasures: barriers to entrepreneurship, barriers to trade
and investment, and state control.
Table 1 tabulates these roadblocks by country and shows their corre-
lation with LMR and other major roadblocks. Figure 2 illustrates the
correlation between the overall LMR measure and other roadblocks, as
well as welfare.2
Table 2 provides first evidence that LMR does not merely capture
other country-level measures. Anti-self-dealing is negatively correlated
with LMR, while no correlation exists between LMR and antidirector
rights. Economic welfare—measured by GDP per capita—is slightly neg-
atively correlated with LMR. Also, some positive correlations exist be-
tween product market competition measures and the submeasures of
LMR. No individual correlation coefficient goes beyond 0.63; that is,
not all variation in LMR is clearly explained by measures of competition.
Figure 2 provides additional evidence by showing that none of the low
correlations are driven by outliers.
In sum, LMR captures something beyond known country-level road-
blocks. At the same time, to alleviate concerns that these country-level
measures may drive our results, we include these country-level controls in
our regressions.
3.3 Sample description
Our baseline data set is that constructed by Lins, Volpin, and Wagner
(2013). The authors start with the December 2006 issue of OSIRIS and
2 Correlations and plots weigh each country equally. Weighting countries by the number of firms or the
number of observations, like in our later analysis, does not affect the conclusions drawn in this section.
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restrict the sample to firms that (1) are active; (2) report sales, assets,
operating profit, and industry for fiscal year 2005; (3) have sales of at
least EUR50mn and assets of at least EUR25mn; and (4) are incorpo-
rated in countries covered by Djankov et al. (2008). Firms in Fama-
French 48 industries with fewer than ten firms in total are removed.
We further restrict the sample to firms that are incorporated in coun-
tries for which the OECD employment protection measure is available.
This leaves 6,983 unique sample firms in twenty-eight countries. Japan
(1,593), the United Kingdom (1,048), and Australia (763) are most
represented.
Figure 2
Labor market regulation and other country-level measures
This figure plots the overall OECD Labor Market Regulation measure against various country-level
measures for the twenty-eight sample countries. Panels A and B show investor protection measures: the
Anti-self-dealing index by Djankov et al. (2008) and the Antidirector index by La Porta et al. (1998). Panel
C shows the logarithm of GDP per capita in 2008. Panel D shows the overall product market regulation
measure. Each “x” represents a country.
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We apply the definition of family firm employed by Franks et al. (2012)
and Lins, Volpin, and Wagner (2013). Family firm is a dummy variable
equal to one if voting rights held by an individual or through a group of
family members exceed 25%, directly or via a control chain. A more
detailed description of the sample selection and family-firm classification
can be found in Franks et al. (2012). Table 2, panel A, presents our
Table 2
Sample firms
A. Family firms by country
Country Number of firms Number of family firms % family firms
Australia 763 42 5.50
Austria 39 7 17.95
Belgium 73 16 21.92
Brazil 96 6 6.25
Canada 430 21 4.88
Chile 58 2 3.45
Denmark 67 7 10.45
Finland 83 7 8.43
France 408 146 35.78
Germany 336 108 32.14
Greece 89 30 33.71
India 328 24 7.32
Ireland 36 3 8.33
Israel 38 4 10.53
Italy 154 49 31.82
Japan 1,593 11 0.69
Korea 491 115 23.42
Mexico 39 5 12.82
Netherlands 84 9 10.71
New Zealand 46 3 6.52
Norway 71 14 19.72
Portugal 31 5 16.13
South Africa 115 16 13.91
Spain 88 20 22.73
Sweden 128 12 9.38
Switzerland 137 21 15.33
Turkey 114 27 23.68
United Kingdom 1,048 90 8.59
Total 6,983 820 11.74
B. Firm-level summary statistics
N Mean Median SD 25th pctl. 75th pctl.
ROA 45,953 3.2% 5.8% 17.9% 1.4% 10.7%
ROCE 45,953 6.3% 10.2% 32.1% 2.6% 18.6%
log(Assets) 45,953 12.6 12.7 2.1 11.4 13.9
R&D/assets 45,953 1.9% 0.0% 5.9% 0.0% 1.2%
Leverage 45,953 50.1% 51.7% 22.8% 34.2% 66.1%
Age 45,953 15.4 13.0 10.3 7.0 21.0
This table provides firm-level summary statistics. Panel A shows family firms by country. Family firms
are firms where voting rights held by an individual or a group of family members exceed 25%, directly or
via a control chain. Panel B provides firm-level summary statistics. ROA is EBIT over total assets;
ROCE is EBIT over total assets less current liabilities; R&D/Assets is R&D spending over total assets;
Leverage is total debt over total assets; and Age is years since incorporation or years since the firm first
appears on Datastream if incorporation year is missing. All nonbinary variables are winsorized at the 1st
and 99th percentiles.













pus user on 17 April 2020
sample across countries and divided into total number of firms, number
of family firms, and share of family firms. Twelve percent of sample firms
are classified as family firms. France (36%), Greece (34%), Germany
(32%), and Italy (32%) have the largest fraction of family firms.
One major challenge of using a 25% share of ownership as the defini-
tion of family firms is that we leave out firms that are controlled and
managed by families with a smaller ownership stake. Whereas this nar-
rowing of the definition is true for all countries, it affects Japan dispro-
portionally, because in Japan, most of the families control their firms
with a relatively small amount of ownership and rely more on long-term
stable relationships with other key owners, such as financial institutions
(Bennedsen et al. 2015). As a result, we categorize few firms as family
firms in Japan. To check that our results do not depend on this catego-
rization, we repeat all our analyses by excluding Japan. This alteration
does not change the qualitative results; thus, to save space, we only pre-
sent the results for the full sample including Japan.
Our sample period is 2001–2009, and our family firm identifier is from
2006. Importantly, Franks et al. (2012) show that family ownership is
relatively stable using the same data set, and it is thus reasonable to
assume it has been fairly robust during the sample period.
3.4 Firm- and industry-level control variables
Panel B of Table 2 provides a brief description of firm- and industry-level
controls. All firm-level controls are from Worldscope and Datastream
and are winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. Our key performance meas-
ures are Return on assets (ROA) and Return on capital employed
(ROCE), which are constructed as Earnings before interest and taxes
(EBIT) over total assets and as EBIT over total assets less current liabil-
ities, respectively. In the robustness section, we additionally confirm our
results for measuring performance by Tobin’s q and Return on equity.
Log(Assets) is the log of total assets. R&D/Assets is defined as research
and development costs over total assets where, in line with the literature,
research and development costs are assumed to be zero if missing.
Leverage is defined as long-term debt divided by total assets. Log(Age)
is the log of years since firm foundation or the log of years since a firm
first appeared in DataStream if the foundation year is missing.
The average sample firm has ROA of 3.2%, ROCE of 6.3%, R&D/
assets of 1.9%, leverage of 50.1%, and log(Assets) of 12.6, the latter
reflecting the size criteria imposed by Lins, Volpin, and Wagner (2013)
on sample firms. Standard deviations of ROA and ROCE are 17.9% and
32.1%, respectively, which reflect country and industry differences as
well as economic up- and downturns captured by our sample period.
Given these relatively large standard deviations, our preferred
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interpretation of economic magnitudes of main effects is in relation to the
standard deviation.
4. Results
As discussed in the introduction, the theoretical impact of higher LMR
on firms’ performance is ambiguous. First, higher costs of firing workers
increase overall production costs and thus reduce profits. Second, higher
labor costs may lead firms to substitute labor for capital, thus increasing
labor productivity. Third, higher firing costs increase job security of
workers. This may have a positive effect on labor productivity if workers
make larger relationship-specific investments into their jobs or a negative
effect if workers exhibit less effort, knowing that the likelihood of being
fired is smaller. Fourth, and finally, higher labor costs may work as a
general barrier to entry, which reduces competition and thus allows in-
cumbent firms to enjoy higher rents. As theory suggests many opposing
effects of higher labor costs, we focus on the empirical relationship be-
tween labor costs and differential performance of family and nonfamily
firms.
In this section, we present our results. First, we focus on showing that
labor market regulation affects the differential performance of family
and nonfamily firms. We begin with univariate illustration, proceed
with multivariate regressions, and then focus on selection issues using
matched sample and instrumental variable regressions. We then look at
which submeasures of labor market regulation drive our results. Next, we
provide evidence to show through which channel the differential perfor-
mance result arises. We conclude with further robustness checks using
alternative institutional roadblocks and alternative measures of employ-
ment protection.
4.1 Univariate analysis
Table 3, panel A, provides first insights into the firm-level relation be-
tween LMR and firms’ performance based on univariate analysis. We
calculate firms’ performance, measured by return on assets, for firms in
countries with weak and strong employment protection by family and
nonfamily firms. The first row shows that publicly traded firms, in gen-
eral, have higher returns on assets in countries with high LMR; the dif-
ference is 4.89 percentage points and is significant. As we show below,
this correlation does not carry over when we add control variables, spe-
cifically other country-level controls, to the analysis.
The first column shows that family firms in our sample outperform
nonfamily firms by 2.2 percentage points. The double-split reveals that
this result is driven by countries with low LMR, while family firms have
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lower ROA than nonfamily firms in countries with high LMR. The dif-
ference-in-differences of family firms’ performance in countries with low
versus high LMR is 3.4 percentage points. Hence, family firms have a
relative performance advantage in countries with low LMR.
It is important to point out here that the economic magnitude of the
effect appears large. However, we have two remarks regarding this effect:
First, we so far only look at univariate relations—some of the difference
in performance may be driven by other firm characteristics. Second, as
noted above, the standard deviation of performance variables through-
out our sample period is large. Indeed, a difference in ROA of 3.4 per-
centage points reflects roughly 20% of the standard deviation of ROA.3
Panel B measures performance by return on capital employed and
confirms these results. The difference-in-differences is 4.7 percentage
points and roughly 15% of the sample standard deviation. Overall, this
result supports the notion that family firms’ ability to better insure labor
is worth more in countries where labor is less protected through public
labor market regulation.
Figure 3 takes this simple insight one step further by mapping the gap
between return on assets of family and nonfamily firms (vertical axis) to
the aggregate level of labor market regulation (horizontal axis). The line
of best fit illustrates a clear negative relationship, confirming that family
firms have a comparative advantage in countries with lower labor market
Table 3











A. Return on assets
(1) All firms 3.19% 1.97% 6.86% 4.89%***
(2) Family firms 5.11% 4.16% 6.06% 1.90%***
(3) Nonfamily firms 2.95% 1.79% 7.10% 5.31%***
(2) - (3) Difference 2.16%*** 2.37%*** 1.04%*** 3.41%***
B. Return on capital employed
(1) All firms 6.26% 4.29% 12.17% 7.88%***
(2) Family firms 8.90% 7.00% 10.80% 3.80%%***
(3) Nonfamily firms 5.92% 4.07% 12.57% 8.50%***
(2) - (3) Difference 2.98%*** 2.93%*** 1.77%*** 4.70%***
This table compares operating performance of family and nonfamily firms in countries with low and
high overall labor market protection (LMR), respectively. Operating performance is measured as return
on assets in panel A and return on capital employed in panel B. Each year, the set of sample countries is
split into low LMR countries and high LMR countries. Table 2 defines all variables. *p < .1; **p < .05;
***p < .01.
3 Assuming that ROA is normally distributed, a firm with an ROA 3.4% points above the mean and
median will be at the 58th percentile.
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regulation. The difference between return on assets of family and non-
family firms is positive in countries, such as the United Kingdom,
Ireland, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and Denmark, with a low level
of labor market protection. The difference between return on assets of
family and nonfamily firms is close to zero or negative in countries, such
as France, Norway, Turkey, and Portugal, with a high level of labor
market protection. While this illustration is based on equally weighted
observations, results are unchanged when weighting country-level obser-
vations by the number of sample firms.
Figure 3
Performance difference and labor market regulation
This figure shows the relation between the performance difference of family versus nonfamily firms and
labor market regulation. Each “x” represents one sample country. Labor market regulation is measured
using the OECD Overall Labor Protection measure. Panel A plots the average performance difference
between family firms and nonfamily firms against the Overall Labor Protection measure. The perfor-
mance difference is calculated country by country as the difference between average Return on assets
(ROA) of family firms and average ROA of nonfamily firms in 2008. Panel B considers the relation
between changes in ROAs and changes in Overall Labor Protection between 2003 and 2008 for family
firms (left) and nonfamily firms (right). The x-axis reflects the change in Overall Labor Protection from
2008 to 2003. The y-axis reflects the difference between average ROA in 2008 and average ROA in 2003.
Panel C considers the difference in difference; the x-axis reflects the change in Overall Labor Protection
from 2008 to 2003. The y-axis shows the change in ROA of family firms from 2003 to 2008 and the change
in ROA of nonfamily firms.
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Next, we consider how changes in labor market regulation affect the
performance difference between family and nonfamily firms. Panel B of
Figure 3 plots changes in return on assets of family firms (left) and non-
family firms (right) between 2003 and 2008 against changes in the
OECD’s LMR measure, focusing on the five countries that experienced
a change in the overall labor market protection measure during the pe-
riod 2003 to 2008. We find weak evidence that an increase in the level of
LMR is associated with lower returns on assets in family firms and higher
returns on assets in nonfamily firms.
Panel C concludes this part of the analysis by combining the two figures of
panel B to show that the difference in return on assets closes as LMR grows
stronger. While this evidence is consistent with the results of Table 3 and hints
at a causal link between labor market regulation and performance difference,
we acknowledge that five countries are too few to draw general conclusions.
In conclusion, this subsection shows that the gap between return on
assets of family firms and nonfamily firms decreases in overall strictness
of labor market protection. This finding is consistent with the notion
that family ownership provides implicit labor protection. Of course,
until now, these statements are based on simple univariate correlations.
In the following subsections, we provide more evidence for this result—
evidence lending support to a causal interpretation of the results.
4.2 Multivariate analysis
We now turn to multivariate analysis. Specifically, the results of the
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age, or industry selection. We start with simple multivariate ordinary
least squares (OLS) regressions and add a battery of robustness tests.
We then match family firms to nonfamily firms using a propensity score
matching method and employ instrumental variable regressions to ad-
dress selection concerns. We conclude by examining the submeasures of
LMR to better understand which types of labor market regulation are
driving our results.
4.2.1 LMR and differential performance of family firms. Table 4 ana-
lyzes the relation between LMR and firms’ performance. The dependent
variable is performance measured by Return on assets and Return on
capital employed. The key explanatory variables are LMR and the
Family Firm indicator, as well as their interaction. Column 1 shows
that LMR does not statistically or economically significantly affect firms’
performance, as measured by return on assets. Thus, on average, labor
market regulation is not associated with the performance of publicly
traded companies. The most important determinants of the performance
are firm size, R&D intensity, and country-level GDP per capita.
Next, Column 2 introduces our family firm indicator as an additional
control. The family firm dummy loads positively on performance: family
firms have 2.1 percentage points higher ROA, reflecting 12% of the
sample’s standard deviation, respectively. Thus, highly concentrated
family ownership (above 25%) is correlated with superior performance.
This finding may result from the fact that we are looking at (a) the largest
firms in each country and (b) a strict definition of family firms. Many
prior studies have analyzed how the definition of a family firm affects the
differential performance of family and nonfamily firms (see, e.g.,
Anderson and Reeb 2003; Villalonga and Amit 2006; Miller et al.
2007; the survey in Bennedsen, Perez-Gonzalez, and Wolfenzon 2010).
This literature has documented that factors such as size, industry, coun-
try, the role of the founder, and the number of generations currently
involved in the business are important. Given the size of this literature,
we will not pursue this further in the present paper.
We are particularly interested in the effect of being a family firm in low
LMR environments. Therefore, we introduce the interaction between
LMR and family firms in Column 3. While family firms outperform
nonfamily firms in terms of ROA on average, they outperform nonfamily
firms less in high LMR countries: the interaction effect is statistically
significant at 1% and economically important. Indeed, a one standard
deviation decline in LMR (¼0.82) is associated with a 1.07 percentage
points higher ROA for family relative to nonfamily firms.
As is usual for cross-country studies, we are concerned about a causal
interpretation of the main result in Column 3. Differences between family
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firms and nonfamily firms may be correlated with country characteristics
that we are not controlling for in the first three columns. For this reason,
we introduce country fixed effects in Column 4 and in most of the fol-
lowing tables. The antidirector and anti-self-dealing measures do not
vary across time, so they are absorbed by the country fixed effects.
Furthermore, the variation in GDP per capita is very small too, but we
keep it in the regression. Whereas the level of LMR is identified by only
the five countries that have variation across time, it is important to notice
that interaction effect between LMR and family firm status is identified
for the whole sample of countries. Introducing country fixed effect does
not change our results above, except for making the interaction coeffi-
cient between LMR and family firm marginally smaller.
Table 5 presents a battery of robustness tests based on measures of
performance and sample selection all with country fixed effects. Our
results are significant though economically somewhat smaller when using
median regressions (Columns 1 and 2), reflecting that larger and smaller
Table 4
Labor market regulation, family firms, and firms’ performance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable ROA ROA ROA ROA ROCE ROCE
Labor market reg. (LMR) 0.006 0.003 0.006 0.002 0.009 0.017
(0.85) (0.50) (0.84) (0.05) (0.79) (0.30)
Family firm 0.021*** 0.046*** 0.040*** 0.065*** 0.055***
(3.20) (5.17) (3.65) (4.35) (2.88)
(LMR) x (Family firm) 0.013*** 0.011*** 0.017** 0.016**
(3.48) (3.25) (2.74) (2.54)
log(Assets) 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.031*** 0.031***
(3.64) (3.68) (3.68) (3.52) (4.29) (4.17)
R&D/assets 0.969*** 0.962*** 0.960*** 0.989*** 1.382*** 1.424***
(9.87) (10.00) (10.00) (10.44) (10.03) (10.85)
Leverage 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.019 0.057 0.049
(0.37) (0.40) (0.40) (0.56) (1.03) (0.89)
log(Age) 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.005
(0.34) (0.36) (0.36) (0.49) (0.19) (0.33)
log(GDP per capita) 0.026*** 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.020 0.046*** 0.035
(5.35) (5.93) (5.62) (1.05) (4.76) (1.01)
Antidirector 0.011 0.012 0.010 0.001
(0.37) (0.40) (0.32) (0.03)
Anti-self-dealing 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.009
(1.00) (1.26) (1.32) (1.24)
Industry FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FEs No No No Yes No Yes
Observations 45,953 45,953 45,953 46,708 45,953 46,708
Adj. R-squared .205 .206 .206 .216 .150 .158
This table reports OLS regressions where the dependent variable is firms’ performance. The sample
period is 2001–2009. The key explanatory variable is overall OECD labor market regulation (lagged).
Table 2 defines all firm-level variables, which are lagged by one year. Country-level controls include log
of GDP per capita (World Bank), Antidirector index, Anti-self-dealing index, and country fixed effects
where indicated. Regressions also include year and industry fixed effects where industries are Fama-
French (48) industries. t-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the country level.
*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
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ROA and ROCE observations drive some of the economic magnitudes in
Table 4. One concern may be that ROA and ROCE are tilted toward
positive values, though logging these variables does not affect our results
(Columns 3 and 4). One may also argue that our results could be driven
by Japanese firms. First, Japanese firms constitute 23% of our sample
firms and 26.7% of firm-year observations. Second, as discussed before,
the strict definition of family firms used in this analysis means that we
have very few family firms in Japan. However, removing Japan from our
analysis only marginally affects the economic significance of our results
(Columns 5 and 6). Last, we show that our results are robust to using
alternative measures of performance, notably Return on equity and qual-
itatively similar using Tobin’s q (Columns 7 and 8). The economic mag-
nitude of being a family firm and moving to a country with one standard
deviation higher LMR represents 6.3% of the standard deviation of
ROE. Thus, the economic magnitude is very similar to our results on
ROA and ROCE.
In this subsection, we have shown that the gap between Return on
assets of family firms and nonfamily firms decreases in strictness of labor
market protection even after controlling for relevant observables and
introducing country fixed effects. Furthermore, this result is robust to
alternative performance measures, excluding Japan and using median
regression techniques.
4.2.2 Selection.
4.2.2.1 Matching. We first address the concern that there is heteroge-
neity of firm characteristic across types of ownership. We focus on large
publicly traded companies across the world, so differences in size and
many other dimensions between our family and nonfamily firms are
bound to occur. We alleviate this concern by repeating our analysis in
a matched sample using propensity score matching. Specifically, for each
year, nonfamily firms are matched to family firms in the same country by
industry and firm characteristics including log(assets), R&D/assets, and
leverage. For each family firm, we choose the one nonfamily firm that is
most similar to function as its control group. Panel A of Table 6 shows
that propensity scores of family firms and matched nonfamily firms are
indistinguishable. Yet univariate analysis in panel A immediately con-
firms our prior finding that family firms outperform nonfamily firms in a
matched sample.
Panel B extends the analysis to a multivariate setting so as to reconfirm
our results on the interaction of family firms and labor market regula-
tion. Again, we find that the superior performance of family firms is more
pronounced in countries with low LMR. The effect is stronger in mag-
nitude. Indeed, a one standard deviation decline in LMR (¼0.82) is
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associated with a 2.95 percentage points higher ROA and 4.3 percentage
points higher ROCE for family relative to nonfamily firms, reflecting
17.1% and 12.7% of the matched sample standard deviations, respec-
tively. Economically, these effects are slightly larger than for the full
sample multivariate analysis and smaller than for the univariate split.
4.2.2.2 Instrumental variable approach. The matching approach does
assure that we are comparing similar firms when we study performance
differences between family and nonfamily firms. However, we are also
concerned that being a family firm with concentrated family ownership
could be a choice variable. Some families may dilute ownership because
of business needs, while others will maintain control even if they have to
forgo potential investment projects. We cannot rule out the possibility
that the choice of keeping concentrated family ownership for a publicly
traded company is at least partially determined by the level of labor
market regulation across countries.
To mitigate the concern of reverse causality or other issues related to
endogeneity, we instrument family control using a survey based measure
Table 6
Firms’ performance for matched samples
A. Outcome of propensity score matching
Family firms (%) Nonfamily firms (%) p-value
Propensity score 26.5 26.2 .24
ROA 5.37 2.85 <.01
ROCE 9.49 5.33 <.01
B. Regressions using the matched sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable ROA ROA ROA ROCE ROCE ROCE
Labor market reg. (LMR) 0.007 0.007 0.022 0.003 0.004 0.038
(0.17) (0.17) (0.44) (0.05) (0.05) (0.48)
Family firm 0.018* 0.101*** 0.033** 0.153***
(1.94) (3.04) (2.24) (3.06)
(LMR) x (Family firm) 0.036** 0.053**
(2.75) (2.52)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,194 6,194 6,194 6,194 6,194 6,194
Adj. R-squared .119 .121 .122 .093 .094 .095
This table reports propensity score matching results. Specifically, nonfamily firms are matched to family
firms by country and all firm characteristics using propensity score matching to find the nearest neighbor
by propensity score (with replacement) each year. Panel A provides a univariate split by family firm
identifier of the propensity score as well as of the key operating performance measures. Panel B performs
regressions for the matched sample, where the dependent variable is firms’ performance. Firm-level
controls and fixed effects the same as those used in Table 4. t-statistics are in parentheses. Standard
errors are clustered at the country level. *p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
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of family value. The World Value Survey is based on interviews with a
representative sample of 1,000-4,000 individuals in each country and
conducted over several years. Individuals are randomly chosen from
among the entire population. Thus, one strength of using this data to
generate instruments for ownership choices is that most if not all of the
respondents have little or no connections with the firms in our sample; we
therefore claim that mean survey answers are not affected by the own-
ership choices that owners in our sample make; that is, the answer to the
World Value Survey is exogenous to the choice of diluting ownership in
our sample.
We use perception of family value from survey participants and var-
iations in that perceptions as instruments to our regression. Family values
is based on question a001 of the World Value Survey about how impor-
tant family is in a respondent’s life. Respondents can answer on a scale
from 1 to 4. We construct the mean response at the year-country level,
using data from previous years for years in which the survey was not
carried out. Every year, we construct a dummy (High Family Values) set
equal to one if a country has above-median family values in that year. We
argue that strong family values are associated with a higher likelihood of
families keeping entrepreneurial activities within the family, including a
higher likelihood of family successions when founders retire. Thus, we
expect that family firms are more common in countries with strong fam-
ily values. We use the standard deviation of this variable as our second
instrument to capture variations in response to the perceptions of family
value. High Family Value Std is a dummy equal to one if the standard
deviation of family value is above median in a given year and zero
otherwise.
Table 7 reports the first-stage estimation in Columns 1 to 2 and
second-stage estimations in Column 3 and 4. In the first stage, we use
family values and the standard deviation to this to instrument for family
firms and the interaction between family firms and LMR. We report the
first-stage estimation for Family Firm in Column 1 and that for Family
Firm interacted with LMR in Column 2. We cluster the standard errors
at country level. As predicted, family firms are more important in coun-
tries with high family values and high variations in perceptions of family
values. First-stage F-tests suggest our instruments are not weak
instruments.
Columns 3 and 4 report second-stage results for ROA and ROCE.
After correcting for ownership choices, the gap between ROA of family
firms and nonfamily firms still significantly decreases in strictness of la-
bor market protection. Second-stage Hansen’s J tests are not rejected,
suggesting that exogeneity assumptions of our instruments are valid.
While this finding confirms that our previous result is not due to reverse
causality, we also notice that the magnitude of the coefficients are very
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large. However, we exercise the customary caution in interpreting the size
of the IV coefficients: First, family values may explain the choice between
being a family firm and not being a family firm for some but not for all
observations; that is, the IV estimate may come from a subset of obser-
vations for which the instrument applies. Second, the predicted value of
Family firm from stage (1) might no longer be equal to 1, which also
makes size interpretations challenging.
Table 7
Instrumental variable regressions












High family values 0.826*** 1.743***
(6.37) (6.40)
High family values SD 0.626*** 1.205***
(3.45) (3.04)
(LMR) x High family values 0.437*** 0.952***
(6.65) (6.77)
(LMR) x High family values SD 0.360*** 0.739***
(4.38) (4.02)
Family firm 1.364*** 2.526**
(2.71) (2.51)
(LMR) x Family firm 0.601** 1.050**
(2.30) (2.11)
(LMR) 0.465*** 1.207*** 0.122** 0.217**
(8.91) (9.26) (1.99) (2.00)
log(Assets) 0.009** 0.016* 0.036*** 0.071***
(2.25) (1.73) (3.38) (4.67)
R&D/assets 0.289*** 0.393*** 1.080*** 1.659***
(3.06) (3.22) (12.89) (9.64)
Leverage 0.014 0.030 0.152*** 0.133***
(0.56) (0.44) (7.65) (3.10)
log(Age) 0.009 0.020 0.003 0.002
(1.55) (1.41) (0.30) (0.11)
log(GDP per capita) 0.040*** 0.133*** 0.003 0.010
(3.47) (4.53) (0.18) (0.39)
Anti-self-dealing 0.266** 0.390* 0.123* 0.297**
(2.34) (1.65) (1.70) (2.38)
Antidirector 0.009 0.033 0.028** 0.049
(0.28) (0.53) (2.23) (1.50)
Observations 43,785 43,785 43,785 43,785
Industry FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 9.863 9.862
p-value of Hansen’s J test .5354 .799
This table reports instrumental variable regressions for firms’ performance. We instrument both LMR
and (LMR) x (Family firm). Columns 1 and 2 show the result of first-stage regressions. The instruments
are High family value and the interaction of High family value and LMR as well as High family value SD
and the interaction of High family value SD and LMR. Measures of family values are obtained from the
World Value Survey. We obtain Family value from the World Value Survey, specifically Question a001,
which asks how important family is in a respondent’s life. Respondents assign a score of 1 to 3 (1 ¼ not
very important, 3 ¼ very important) to the question. High family value indicates whether a country has
an above-median family value score in any given year. High family value SD takes a value of 1 if
variation in perception of family value is above median in any given year. Columns 3 and 4 show the
second-stage results for ROA and for ROCE, respectively. t-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors
are clustered at the country level. *p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
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4.2.3 Submeasures of LMR. So far, we have established that the overall
level of labor market regulation affects the performance gap between
family and nonfamily firms in a way consistent with the idea that family
firms are better able to protect labor in an environment in which less
regulatory protection exists. We now examine which dimensions of labor
market regulation drive our result. Remember that the overall labor
market regulation measure we use is the accumulation of three submeas-
ures: regulation of permanent employees, regulation of temporary
employees, and regulation of collective dismissal. We already noticed
above that these measures are quite different and that the correlation
between the measures across countries is weak.
Table 8 exactly follows our main specification (Table 4, Column 4)
including country fixed effects, but we replace the overall employment
protection measure with each of its subcomponents. We notice from the
first four columns that the interaction between Family Firm and tempo-
rary as well as regular employment regulation is negative. This holds
both for ROA and for ROCE as our dependent variables. At the same
time, in Columns 5 and 6, the interaction between Family Firm and
regulation of collective dismissal is insignificant for the ROA measure
but positive for the ROCE performance measure.
Taken together, we conclude that the effect of employment protection
on the performance difference between family and nonfamily firms is
driven by temporary and regular labor protection and that the regulation
of collective dismissal if anything has an opposite effect.
4.3 Labor volatility
The literature has highlighted that family firms have a different tradeoff
between worker incentives and worker insurance than do nonfamily
firms. Sraer and Thesmar (2007) and Bach and Serrano-Velarde (2015)
were the first to show that labor volatility and wage levels are lower in
family firms relative to nonfamily firms. This result has been confirmed in
a cross-country setting by Ellul, Pagano, and Schivardi (2018) who also
show that the degree of labor insurance is correlated with the level of
unemployment insurance.
In the following, we investigate whether we can confirm such differ-
ences in labor volatility between family and nonfamily firms and specif-
ically, whether, such differences are correlated with the degree of labor
market regulation. In case of correlation, the result is consistent with the
idea that superior performance by family firms in countries with little
regulation of labor indicates that family firms have better labor
management.
In Table 9, we study whether labor volatility is associated with LMR,
family firms, and the interaction of the two. All controls are taken from
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our main specification in Table 4. The dependent variable, labor volatil-
ity, is measured by the logged annual change in employment.
Consistent with the notion that family firms may provide insurance
where LMR is otherwise weak, we find that labor volatility is signifi-
cantly lower across family firms in low LMR countries. Indeed, a one
standard deviation decline in LMR is associated with a 1.21 percentage
Table 8
Submeasures of labor market regulation, family firms, and firms’ performance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LMR submeasure Temporary Temporary Regular Regular CollDismiss CollDismiss
Dependent variable ROA ROCE ROA ROCE ROA ROCE
LMR 0.007 0.011 0.050 0.035 0.075 0.175
(0.35) (0.36) (1.63) (0.55) (1.23) (1.50)
Family firm 0.039*** 0.051** 0.056*** 0.076*** 0.007 0.011
(3.33) (2.76) (3.50) (3.41) (0.48) (0.47)
(LMR) x (Family firm) 0.009** 0.012** 0.016** 0.022** 0.005 0.014**
(2.72) (2.12) (2.47) (2.20) (1.24) (2.22)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 46,708 46,708 46,708 46,708 46,708 46,708
Adj. R-squared .194 .145 .194 .145 .194 .146
This table reports OLS regressions where the dependent variable is firms’ performance, using three
submeasures of LMR: temporary employment protection, regular employment protection, and collective
dismissal protection. Firm-level controls and fixed effects are the same as those used in Table 4. t-
statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. *p < .1; **p < .05;
***p < .01.
Table 9
Labor market regulation, family firms, and labor volatility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LMR submeasure Overall Overall Temporary Regular CollDis
LMR 1.275 1.044 0.338 1.386 0.664
(0.94) (0.74) (0.90) (1.08) (0.88)
Family firm 1.017 1.955* 1.202* 0.471 4.811*
(1.19) (1.89) (1.87) (0.42) (1.99)
LMR*Family firm 1.481** 1.170*** 0.703 1.274*
(2.38) (3.07) (0.90) (2.01)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 17,731 17,731 17,731 17,731 17,731
Adj. R-squared .010 .011 .011 .010 .010
This table reports results of OLS regressions for labor volatility at the firm level. The left-hand-side
variable is Labor volatility, the 4-year moving average standard deviation of percentage change in
number of employees. Labor market regulation is the overall OECD labor market regulation measure,
lagged by 1 year, in Columns 1 and 2, as well as the three submeasures in the remaining columns:
temporary employment protection, regular employment protection, and collective dismissal protection.
Firm-level controls and fixed effects are the same as those used in Table 4. t-statistics are in parentheses.
Standard errors are clustered at the country level. *p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
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point reduction in labor volatility for family relative to nonfamily firms.
This reduction is economically important: the average year-to-year per-
centage change in employment is 6.23%, suggesting an effect of 19.4% of
the mean.
Table 9, Columns 3, 4, and 5, repeat the analysis but substitute the
overall LMR measure with each of its three subcomponents. In line with
the notion that our result is by and large explained by temporary and
regular employment, we find that the labor volatility effect is economi-
cally most important for these submeasures. Statistically, the regulation
of temporary employment is significant at the 1% level, whereas regula-
tion of permanent employment is not statistically significant. Again,
there is a counteracting effect from the regulation of collective dismissal.
Overall, we document that family firms on average have the same
variation in labor as do nonfamily firms. However, in countries with
weaker LMR, family firms have significantly lower variation in labor
relative to nonfamily firms. This finding supports the claim that the su-
perior performance of family firms in low LMR countries is partly driven
by labor relations, such as individual hiring and firing regulations.
4.4 Robustness: Alternative measures of employment protection and
alternative roadblocks
In this section, we provide evidence that our main results hold for a range
of labor market protection measures that are broadly comparable to
LMR and that our results are not obtained by merely replacing LMR
by other roadblock measures.
As stated above, our LMR measures are based on data collected by the
ILO, relying on country officials and law experts to obtain information
about firing procedures, notification rules, and group layoffs that are
comparable across a wide range of countries. These LMR measures
are useful for the purposes of our analysis as they focus on hiring and
firing costs. As a further robustness check, we consider three additional
labor regulation measures—Social Security Legislation (SSL),
Employment Protection Legislation (EPL), and Gross Replacement
Rate (GRR)—that are available across countries and conceptually cap-
ture some aspects of our LMR measure.
SSL, or Social Security Legislation, as introduced by Botero et al.
(2004), measures the level of unemployment benefits. SSL itself is an
average of four normalized variables that capture unemployment insur-
ance. EPL, or Employment Protection Legislation against Dismissal,
also from Botero et al. (2004), measures worker protection granted by
low or mandatory collective agreements against dismissal. EPL is the
average of seven dummy variables that capture the legal obstacles
employers face when dismissing employees. Finally, GRR, or the
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Gross Replacement Rate, introduced by Aleksynska and Schindler
(2011), measures unemployment benefits of dismissed employees as a
fraction of employee earnings. Among these alternatives, EPL is more
closely related to our LMR measure, as it focuses on the specific legal
rules that apply to the dismissal of employees.
In Table 10, we use SSL, EPL, and GRR instead of our LMR measure
to replicate our main results from Table 5. Specifically, the table shows
regressions that correspond to Columns 3 and 6 in Table 5, where
Alternative Measure represents the alternative country-level labor regu-
lation variable. While coefficients are not directly comparable because of
different scaling of the labor regulation variables, the results show that in
all regressions the Family Firm dummy maintains its positive sign, and
Table 10
Robustness: Alternative measures of labor market regulation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable ROA ROA ROA ROCE ROCE ROCE
Family firm 0.039*** 0.037** 0.045*** 0.056*** 0.027 0.060***
(3.72) (2.56) (4.71) (3.05) (1.10) (3.43)
(LMR) x (Family firm) 0.011** 0.011*** 0.007* 0.022*** 0.014* 0.013
(2.73) (2.97) (1.89) (3.54) (2.04) (1.47)
(SSL) x (Family firm) 0.002 0.026
(0.09) (0.88)
(EPL) x (Family firm) 0.002 0.031**
(0.26) (2.08)
(GRR) x (Family firm) 0.048** 0.044
(2.28) (1.12)
Industry FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 46,708 46,708 46,708 46,708 46,708 46,708
Adj. R-squared .216 .216 .216 .158 .158 .158
This table follows the main specification (Table 4, Columns 4 and 6) but additionally introduces alter-
native measures of labor market regulation. The sample period is 2001–2009, and observations are at the
firm-year level. The dependent variables are return on assets (ROA; Columns 1–3) and return on capital
employed (ROCE), respectively. Columns 1 and 4 report results using social security legislation (SSL)
from Botero et al. (2004). SSL measures the level of unemployment benefits as the average of the
following four normalized variables: (1) the number of months of contributions or employment required
to qualify for unemployment benefits by law; (2) the percentage of the worker’s monthly salary deducted
by law to cover unemployment benefits; (3) the waiting period for unemployment benefits; and (4) the
percentage of the net salary covered by the net unemployment benefits in case of a one-year unemploy-
ment spell. Columns 2 and 5 report results using employment protection legislation against dismissal
(EPL) from Botero et al. (2004). EPL measures worker protection granted by law or mandatory collec-
tive agreements against dismissal. It is the average of the following seven dummy variables, which equal
1 (1) if the employer must notify a third party before dismissing more than one worker; (2) if the
employer needs the approval of a third party prior to dismissing more than one worker; (3) if the
employer must notify a third party before dismissing one redundant worker; (4) if the employer needs
the approval of a third party to dismiss one redundant worker; (5) if the employer must provide relo-
cation or retraining alternatives for redundant employees prior to dismissal; (6) if there are priority rules
applying to dismissal or layoffs; and (7) if there are priority rules applying to re-employment. Columns 3
and 6 report results using the gross replacement rate (GRR) for 2005 as used by Aleksynska and
Schindler (2011). GRR measures unemployment insurance benefits received by a worker over the first
2 years of unemployment as a fraction of the worker’s last gross earnings. Firm-level controls and fixed
effects are the same as those used in Table 4. t-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered
at the country level. *p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
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its interaction with SLL and GRR is negative. However, the interaction
with EPL is positive but only statistically significant when we use the
ROCE performance measure.
Overall, this finding confirms that our main results are robust to using
alternative measures of labor market regulation. Because these alterna-
tive measures focus on several different aspects of labor market relations,
and as some of these differences are more subtle than we can capture
here, we treat these results as a robustness test only.
We illustrate in the data section that variation in labor market regu-
lation goes beyond variation in other country-level roadblocks and wel-
fare. Additionally, our analysis so far controls for the relation between
investor protection and performance, as well as welfare and performance.
As a further robustness test, we next investigate whether other institu-
tional roadblocks lead to similar results.
Table 11 uses the main regression setup of Table 5 (Columns 4 and 6),
replacing labor market regulation with measures of investor protection
and economic development. Columns 1 and 2 use the Anti-self-dealing
index (see Djankov et al. 2008); Columns 3 and 4 consider antidirector
rights (La Porta et al. 1998; Djankov et al. 2008). Without time variation
in these two measures, the level effects are absorbed by the country fixed
effect. Columns 5 and 6 measure economic welfare through the logarithm
of GDP per capita. Acknowledging the time variation in GDP, we
Table 11
Robustness: Other roadblocks and welfare
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Anti-self-dealing Antidirector index log(GDP per capita)
ROA ROCE ROA ROCE ROA ROCE
Roadblock -0.021 0.036
(1.11) (1.06)
Family firm 0.007 0.016 0.012 0.005 -0.089 0.166
(0.66) (0.79) (0.56) (0.13) (1.41) (1.35)
Roadblock*Family firm 0.018 0.011 0.007 0.007 0.011 0.019
(0.74) (0.24) (1.18) (0.63) (1.69) (1.56)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 46,708 46,708 46,708 46,708 46,708 46,708
Adj. R-squared .216 .158 .216 .158 .216 .158
This table follows the main specification (Table 4, Columns 4 and 6) but uses alternative roadblocks and
welfare. The sample period is 2001–2009, and observations are at firm-year level. The dependent vari-
ables are return on assets (ROA; odd-numbered columns) and return on capital employed (ROCE; even-
numbered columns), respectively. The key explanatory variable is Djankov et al.’s (2008) Anti-self-
dealing index (Columns 1 and 2), La Porta et al.’s (1998) Antidirector index (Columns 3 and 4), and
log of GDP per capita from the World Bank (Columns 5 and 6). Firm-level controls and fixed effects are
the same as those used in Table 4. t-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the
country level. *p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
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include the level effects in these two columns. We find that these road-
blocks do not significantly explain the performance difference between
family and nonfamily firms.
In sum, this subsection shows that our main result holds for a range of
labor market protection measures that are broadly comparable to LMR
but that our results are not obtained by merely replacing LMR by other
roadblocks. This latter result rules out the prospect that our previous
results are an artefact of omitted variables.
5. Conclusion
A large number of publicly traded firms around the world continue to be
controlled by families. The performance differential between family- and
non-family-controlled firms has been extensively studied, yet only re-
cently has the literature attempted to explain how family control may
affect firms’ performance through the specific channel of labor relations.
This paper provides new evidence on how labor market regulation affects
performance differences between family and nonfamily firms. We show
that family firms outperform nonfamily firms in countries with weaker
labor regulation and that this finding likely results from family firms
being better at managing labor in the absence of regulation.
One advantage of our empirical approach is that it uses an interna-
tional sample to exploit cross-country variation in labor market regula-
tion, while generating a cost, in the sense that our cross-country firm data
exhibit limited richness in measurable firm characteristics. While our
results indicate that family firms manage labor relations better, we can-
not yet pin down the specific channel through which this happens. For
this, future work focusing on single countries and drawing on detailed
micro data may be especially insightful, for example, analyses of
relationship-specific investments made by individual workers in family
versus nonfamily firms.
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